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abstract
Wc investigate the possibility that in the foreign exchange market an 
uninformed speculator finds it convenient to trade on noise in order 
to gain an informational advantage she can exploit in future. In a 
two-period model, we analyze the trade-off she faces between the 
cost of the “informational investment” and the profits this brings 
about. Our results give a possible explanation for the large volume 






















































































































































































A large component of transactions in securities markets derives from noise tra­
ders. According to Black (1986), noise traders are agents who sell and buy 
assets on the basis of irrelevant information. These speculators do not possess 
inside or fundamental information and trade irrationally on noise as though this 
gave them an edge. Despite its irrational nature, noise trading represents an 
important aspect of the functioning of securities markets, because it reduces the 
risk of market crashes and facilitates transactions among agents. Indeed, if all 
traders were rational it would not be convenient to gather information, because 
prices would be fully revealing. Conversely, when noise traders axe present, ra­
tional speculators will gain profits at the expense of the irrational ones. As in 
this case prices will not be fully revealing, there would still be an incentive to 
gather information, so that in practice noise trading may be beneficial for the 
efficiency of securities markets.
Different types of behavior are associated with noise and liquidity trading.1 
These comprise hedging strategics, such as portfolio insurance and stop-loss or­
ders, popular models of forecasting and trading, such as chart and technical ana­
lysis, and so forth. In particular, considering the market for foreign exchange, 
there is ample evidence of widespread use of chartism by traders. Indeed, on 
the basis of a survey conducted in the London foreign exchange market, Allen 
and Taylor (1990) point out that most traders consider chartism at least as 
relevant as fundamentalism in the formulation of exchange rate expectations 
in the short run. Likewise, Frankel and Froot (1987), using survey data in the 
foreign exchange market, find strong evidence of extrapolative expectations and 
attribute it to the utilisation of chartism by professional traders.
A problem with this description of noise trading in securities markets is its 
profitability. In fact, it is commonly believed that noise traders incur losses, be­
cause they buy when prices arc high and sell when prices arc low. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies question this thesis. Goodman (1979) compares the profita­
bility of different forecasting techniques in the market for foreign exchange. In 
the seventies, the worst technically orientated forecasting technique was three 
times more profitable than the best fundamentally orientated one. Likewise, 
Schulmcister (1988) finds that large speculative profits of commercial banks in
'Liquidity traders differ from noise traders in that their transactions are led by hedging 
needs and not by speculative reasons. Generally this distinction is lost in theoretical models 



























































































the market for foreign exchange are due to the utilization of technical trading 
rules. Levich and Thomas (1993) confirm the thesis that chartism is profita­
ble employing a bootstrap approach, while Menkhoff and Schlumberger (1995) 
extend previous results to a longer period.
Therefore, explaining the use of chartism aud other forms of noise tra­
ding represents an important topic of research. Several explanations have been 
proposed. Frankel and Froot (1986) suggest that if traders learn slowly the 
fundamental value of a currency, chartists can dominate fundamentalists and 
lead the exchange rate on a bubble path. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990) show that if irrational traders can bear more risk than other 
traders, they can gain larger profits than risk-averse rational speculators. Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1992) show that if traders have short horizons, they may 
find it convenient to trade on the basis of information completely unrelated to 
fundamentals. Palomino (1996) proves that in small markets in which investors 
are not price takers, noise traders might hurt sophisticated traders more than 
themselves.
Our analysis suggests an alternative explanation, based on a particular 
mechanism of manipulation of expectations and exchange rates. Even if this 
analysis could be applied to other dealer markets, we refer principally to the 
foreign exchange market because it is there that most of the evidence on the 
profitability of noise trading is concentrated. Moreover, it is in this market that 
the mechanism of manipulation we suggest it is most likely to take place.
Noise trading may be part of a valid strategy of manipulation and a source 
of speculative profits, because it can bring about an informational advantage. 
This happens in a dealer market when noise trading interferes with the learning 
process of dealers. In fact, assuming that dealers are competitive and cannot di­
stinguish between informed and uninformed trades, noisy market orders placed 
by an uninformed speculator will reduce their ability to learn the fundamental 
information contained in the order flow. On the other hand, the uninformed 
speculator will be able to extract more of the fundamental information present 
in the flow of orders. Then, in subsequent periods she can use her informational 
advantage to recoup the losses incurred with the initial noisy market orders and 
also gain some profits.
In what follows we consider a model of the foreign exchange market with 
private information on the fundamental value of a foreign currency. This frame­
work permits studying the impact of noise trading on the learning processes of 




























































































governing the exchange rate. In addition, we can analyze the trade-off between 
the cost of noisy market orders and the informational advantage they provide 
and study under which conditions they may be part of a profitable trading 
strategy of an uninformed speculator.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we show that an 
uninformed trader can gain an informational advantage placing random mar­
ket orders in such a market. In the following section we study a two period 
formulation of the model and consider different hypotheses on the informatio­
nal contain of the order flow of the dealer and the behavior of other market 
participants. We show both analytically and numerically under which circum­
stances manipulation takes place. A conclusion which summarizes the results 
of our analysis completes the paper, while an appendix gives detailed proofs of 
Propositions and Lemmas.
2 Noise in the Foreign Exchange Market
To analyze the effect of noise trading on the performance of the foreign exchange 
market, we consider a simple model based on the batch framework put forward 
by Kyle (1985). Despite the structure of the foreign exchange market differs 
from that of the auction market studied by Kyle, there are several reasons that 
justifies the use of the framework he proposed in the present context. First, 
this framework is elegant and powerful, since simple analytical solutions are 
easily derived and have intuitive interpretations. Second, it captures the lack 
of transparency of the foreign exchange market. In fact, in both the auction 
and in the foreign exchange markets dealers cannot observe all market orders 
and prices cannot immediately reveal all information contained in individual 
trades. This characteristic is fundamental for the functioning of any dealer 
market and consequently the batch framework, despite its abstraction, is a valid 
approximation for the study of noise trading in the foreign exchange market.
Now, suppose in the market for foreign exchange a representative dealer 
(market maker) transacts a foreign currency with a population of customers 
before some news on the fundamental value of the currency is announced. Such 
news could concern any macroeconomic variable affecting the value o f the cur­
rency, such as the money supply.
We assume that trading takes place in a sequence of auctions or rounds of 




























































































place their market orders, which arc batched and passed to the market maker. 
Then, since price competition enforces a zero-expected profit condition for the 
dealers, the market maker will set the exchange rate equal to the expected 
fundamental value given his information, according to a weak form efficiency 
condition.
We suppose that there are T rounds of trading before the fundamental 
value of the foreign currency, fo , is announced. The fundamental value is given 
by the sum of T  +  1 independent and normally distributed random variables: 
fo  =  fo +  E L i f / ,  where / 0 oc N (0, Y,f0) and oc N (0, o)\T).
We assume that in any period t the market maker cannot observe the 
fundamental value of the foreign currency, ft — fo +  £/> but that he
receives a total order flow, Ax,, given by the following expression:
Ax, =  at( f t -  s™ x) +  e'„
where a, > 0 and s™ j is the exchange rate set in the previous round of trading.
This assumption implies that the order flow contains both noise and signal 
components. In fact, random market orders, placed by liquidity traders, follow a 
white noise process, of variance of and independent of the fundamental
value. Simultaneously, informative market orders are placed by an agent that 
possesses information on the fundamental value, /, ,  and arbitrages against the 
undervaluation (overv~,,’ ation) of the foreign exchange, / ,  — s™ x. In practice, 
since it is very unlikely that individual investors possess a better knowledge 
of the fundamental value than professional dealers, this agent might well be a 
central bank that has superior information on its current and future monetary 
policy. As suggested in the literature (Edison (1993)), central banks are often 
active in the market for foreign exchange with sterilised intervention operations 
aimed at signalling changes in the fundamentals of exchange rates.
Trading in the foreign exchange market is not conducted as in the auction 
market described here. However, our market maker can represent a typical 
dealer in the foreign exchange market. By trading with his customers and with 
other dealers and by observing brokered inter-dealer transactions, this dealer is 
able to derive some estimate of the aggregate flow of orders placed by external 
customers. Then, according to this interpretation, we could assume that the 
quantity e\ contains both a measure of liquidity trading and an error term of 





























































































The weak form efficiency condition implies that the exchange rate is equal 
to the expected fundamental value of the foreign currency, given the history 
of the order flow, s"' =  E [ft\Axi, • ■ •, Aa;,]. The application of the projection 
theorem for Normal random variables immediately gives a recursive expression 
for the exchange rate:
*r =  C i + A r 'A i,, a )
with s™ =  -So- If one defines , as the conditional variance of the fundamental 
value in period t — 1 given the history of the order flow, { A.r(t}Jcl l1, the liquidity 
coefficient, AJ"̂ , is:
+  ° ) )XT1 =
1 +  <*}) +  ffi2
( 2)
Then, the conditional variance of the fundamental value in period t is:
Sr/ = (l-a,AT/)(E^1 + ̂ /), (3)
where =  £ q.
Suppose, now, that an uninformed speculator enters in the foreign ex­
change market. She cannot observe the fundamental process, { / (}^_0, but can 
place unpredictable random market orders. In this respect, let us introduce the 
following Assumption.
Assum ption 1 In any round of trading t the speculator can commit to use one 
from a set of noise trading technologies, T . Any element t of T  will place at 
time t a random market order btgt, where }^Ll are positive constants and 
{ g, } J=, is a white noise process of variance of, independent of the fundamental 
value and of the liquidity trading process.
In practice we assume that the speculator may access a series of automatic 
trading programmes, based on the processing of information unrelated to the 
innovations in the fundamental value of the foreign currency. This is the case 
for investors using chart and technical analysis: their transactions arc dictated 
by patterns observed in past exchange rates, which in efficient markets are not 
related to future changes in the fundamentals.2
When a noisy trading technology t is used the order flow becomes:
A xt =  af(ft — s j l , ) +  btg, +  e\.
2 Notice t hat a mechanism of commitment is necessary to avoid problems of time consi­
stency. This mechanism can be designed using some form of portfolio delegation as suggested 





























































































Thus, in equation (2), the liquidity coefficient, AJ"̂ , is now equal to:
ymf _  +  a})
' a?(X7-{+ * } )  +  < '
where <r„( =  of (1 +  b2t ). Because of the reduction in A,m̂ , which measures the 
informativeness of the order flow, the conditional variance of f t in equation (3) 
rises for any given value of EJjj. This shows that the uninformed speculator can 
condition the learning process of the market maker: by injecting noise in the 
order flow she can determine the market maker uncertainty on the fundamental 
value. Indeed, it is immediate to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition  1 For any choice of {at}J=u the degree of uncertainty of the mar­
ket maker on the fundamental value, E™̂ , is governed by the noise injected in 
the order flow by the speculator. In particular, if the fundamental value follows 
a random walk, that is if o 2 is strictly positive, the speculator is able to increase 
this uncertainty across time.
Within the batch framework, customers cannot directly observe the order 
flow of the dealer. Anyway, the value of A xt can be determined in equilibrium 
observing the exchange rate customers will pay or receive for one unit of the 
foreign currency in the round t of trading (customers can simply invert equation 
(1) to obtain A xt). In other words, a speculator can “test the water” and 
obtain some useful information on the activity of the foreign exchange market 
by placing a market order with a dealer. On the contrary, posted quotes are 
generally only indicative and never represent firm values, so that they do not 
constitute an instrument of diffusion of information in the market.
Since the speculator will observe ex-post the realisation of her random 
market order, A x ‘ , she can extract at the end of period t the total market 
order of the other customers: A yt — A xt — A x3t. In this way, she can form her 
own expectations of the fundamental value, s3 =  E\ft\Ayi, ■ ■ •, Ay<], which in 
parallel with equation (1) respects the following recursion:
ss, =  s3_l +  Xs/  A yt, (3)
with Sq — so- If one defines EstLx as the conditional variance of the fundamental 
value /;_ i given the history of the other customers' order flow up to period t — 1. 
{A y*.}]^ , Xs/  respects a formulation similar to equation (2):
q,(S^i +  o})





























































































Obviously a recursion for the conditional variance similar to equation (3) holds:
E?/  =  ( l - a tA?/ )(E;£1+<r}), (7)
where E^ =  Eq. Then, studying equations (3) and (7) it is immediate to verify 
the following Proposition.
Proposition  2 For any choice of {cqJ^L,, if the speculator employs a noisy 
trading technology in period 1, bi > 0, then the degree of uncertainty of the 
speculator on the fundamental value is smaller than that for the market maker 
in any round of trading: that is, Vf, T,3/  <  EJ"̂ .
Proposition 2 implies that an uninformed speculator can exploit the uncer­
tainty of the market maker on the information possessed by his clients to derive 
more precise information on the fundamental value of the foreign currency. She 
just needs to inject some noise in the order flow in the first round of trading 
and hence observe the exchange rates set by the market maker in the following 
ones. This is sufficient to gain an informational advantage in the first period 
and to conserve it until the uncertainty on the fundamental value is resolved. 
The informational gain is obtained reducing the information contained in the 
order flow observed by the market maker, that is reducing its signal-to-noisc 
ratio.
In order to analyze how the speculator can use her informational advantage 
we now consider a two period formulation of this model.
3 A Two Period Formulation
In the remaining of the paper we suppose that T =  2, so that there are only 
two rounds of trading. This hypothesis permits isolating a first period, in which 
the speculator invests in the acquisition of an informational advantage, from a 
second one, in which she uses it to gain speculative profits. A multi-period 
formulation of this model is not analytically tractable, but if manipulation is 
viable when only two rounds of trading arc possible, then trading over several 
periods would facilitate it.
Let us assume the speculator is risk-neutral. Then, at any round of trading 
t, t =  1,2, she maximises the expected value of her trading profits, E[ns\Its], 



























































































the foreign currency in period 2, with s™ the exchange rate fixed by the market 
maker and with A x* the market order of the speculator at time t. As the 
fundamental value is publicly announced at the end of period 2, the speculator 
will realise the following total profits: ixs — Yn=\{f2 ~  s{")Aaf.
Since the speculator does not possess any superior information on the 
fundamental value of the foreign currency, she might find it useful to gain an 
informational advantage by using some noisy trading technology, t, in period
1. As she does not have an incentive to preserve an informational advantage 
beyond period 2, no further noise trading will be considered.3
Hence, suppose that in period 1 the speculator chooses a noise trading 
technology t and places a random market order, bxrft. Given that the total 
market order the dealer observes in period 1 is Axi — ax( f x — So) +  Wfh +  e[, 
the dealer sets the following exchange rate in accordance to the weak-form 
efficiency condition:
— sq +  A x x, where =
and of j =  1
a 1£{
a?S{ +  (Th '
, 2/1 . l2\
(8)
Thus, considering that the speculator cannot predict her random market 
order before selecting the technology t, the profits she expects from trading in 
the first period are given by:
E [ { h - s ' ? ) A X\\Lx\ =  -b\\'?so l  (9)
Moreover, if one defines s* as the expected fundamental value conditional on 
her information at the end of period 1, this is given by:
s* =  Xs/ A y  u where a i£ {
a\Yj{ + of ( 10)
and Ayi =  A x x — bxyx. Then, we can prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose the speculator places a market order, bxrix, according to the 
noise trading technology t in the first period. Then, her expected second period
’ Instead, in a multi-period formulation the speculator could find it profitable to use a 
trading strategy which comprises a noise component in all, but the last, rounds of trading. 





























































































profits, conditional on her first period information set, are given by the following 
expression:
E\K|/.i] = -  x f)  ( (1 /)2) . (H)
where A™̂  is the liquidity coefficient for period 2.
Since (A“  ̂— A™̂ ) and b\\'̂ af are both increasing in b, corollary of Lemma 
1 is the following Proposition.
Proposition  3 The speculator in period 1 faces a trade-off between second pe­
riod profits and first period losses.
Indeed, in order to acquire an informational advantage the speculator has 
to inject noise in the order flow. Given that in period 1 she does not have more 
information than the dealer and that this provides liquidity to the market with a 
transaction cost, the speculator faces a cost for her “informational investment” . 
The cost for this investment is increasing in the noise injected in the order 
flow, and so arc the profits the speculator can obtain in the second round of 
trading. In fact, these arc increasing in aiE{(As/ — A™ )̂, which measures the 
informational advantage she accpiires in the first period.
To establish if manipulation on the part of the speculator takes place, 
we need to sec which noise trading technology she selects in period 1. This 
technology will be chosen maximizing the expected value of her total profits, 
7rs, that is:
bi — argmax £ ’[7rs(f»1)|/ls], where
£ K ( M  |/.i] =  - f f A r y  +  a . S f j A f - A ^ ) ^ 1 ^ / ^ 2) -  (12)
Unfortunately, a simple analytical solution for this optimisation problem 
docs not exist, since A™̂  and A™̂  depend on fq in a complicated way, and unless 
we impose some restrictions on the parameters of the model, some numerical 
procedure will be necessary to find the optimal value of b1. Anyway, there is an 
important case in which an analytical solution exists.
3.1 Sporadic Central Bank Intervention
As we already suggested, central banks often intervene in the market for foreign 




























































































in the monetary policy and condition market expectations and exchange rates.'1 
However, this kind of intervention is generally sporadic and concentrated in 
short periods of time, so that there always exists a spell of time between this 
intervention and the release of data on monetary aggregates. In other words, we 
refer to situations in which a sterilised operation is carried out a day before some 
announcement on the monetary growth. We can then introduce the following 
Assumption.
Assum ption 2 In the second round of trading the dealer receives market orders 
only from the speculator and the liquidity traders, in that a2 =  0.
Then, the following Proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition  4 Under the conditions of Assumption 2 there exists a unique li­
near Nash equilibrium of the foreign exchange market with manipulation on the 
part of an uninformed speculator. The manipulation mechanism of the specula­
tor comprises the use of a noisy trading technology t in the first period, and an 
informative market order in the second one.
In equilibrium, the market orders of the speculator and the exchange rates are 
as follows:
A x \ = b im, Ax°2 =  b2(s\ -s? -y , (13)
s™ =  +  X\nfA x u s™ =  s™ +  \™f A x2, (14)
where:
b (  . ? £ (+ < *  y ,! L 4(a?S{ +  0 ?) (15)
V l6afE{ +  15<t,2 J ' °2 — ' a iSj
mf a i£ {(16a fz { +  15<t,2) y n f  a l ^ { (16)
16(a?E{ +  <r,2)2 '*  _  8( « iE{ +  o f) '
s i =  so +  Xs/ Ay i, y f  « l£ {
A‘ " a ? E { + a f
(17)
This Proposition suggests that foreign exchange intervention stimulates 
trading in the market for foreign exchange, because a speculator enters in the 4
4See Dominguez and Frankel (1993) for a general discussion on foreign exchange policy 
and a detailed analysis of data on foreign exchange intervention. See also Vitale (1997) for a 




























































































market in order to acquire information from the central bank activity and gain 
speculative profits. On turn, her action increases the volatility of exchange 
rates. Consider, in fact, that the variance of the exchange rate conditional on 
ft is in period 1 and in period 2. These values are larger
when bi > 0, that is when the speculator enters in the market. In effect, central 
bank intervention is often accompanied by a rise in the volume of transactions 
and the volatility of exchange rates and it is a least reassuring that the present 
model captures this aspect of the functioning of the foreign exchange market.
3.2 Comparative Static
To complete our analysis of the effect of noise trading in the foreign exchange 
market, we can consider a short comparative static exercise. In this respect let 
us introduce the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Under the conditions of Assumption 2 the profits the speculator ex­
pects to gain in the second round of trading are twice as much the losses expected 
in the first period. The total expected profits of the speculator conditional on her 
first period information set are given by the following expression:
E[tts
a^oj Ej
16(a?E{ +  a,2)
(18)
This Lemma permits proving the following Proposition, which links the 
speculator profits to the parameters of the model.
Proposition  5 Under the conditions of Assumption 2 the expected profits of 
the speculator are increasing in the volume of liquidity trading (of ) and the 
uncertainty on the fundamental value (£,{,)■ They arc increasing (decreasing) 
in the intensity of trading of the insiders, a j, if this is smaller (larger) than
K / E  f ) 1/2-
In effect, a larger volume of liquidity trading implies a more aggressive 
trading strategy for the speculator, since her trading intensities, bt and 62, arc 
larger in both periods (see Table 1, in which we report the signs of the derivatives 




























































































respect to the parameters of the model).5 Indeed, the increased volume of 
liquidity trading reduces the unitary cost of her random market order in the 
first period and permits her to hide better her market order in the second period. 
The larger noise-to-signal ratio of the order flow in both periods also explains 
why we have a more liquid (smaller values of A™̂ , for t — 1, 2) and less efficient 
(larger E™ ,̂ for t =  1, 2) market.
On the other hand, a larger initial uncertainty on the fundamental value, 
Eq, forces the speculator to inject less noise in the order flow in the first round 
of trading and to be less aggressive in the second one as well (bt is smaller for 
t =  1 and 2). Hence, the order flow is more informative and the liquidity of the 
market falls (A)n̂  is larger for t — 1 and 2). Despite a less aggressive trading 
strategy, the speculator still gains larger profits. In effect, the unconditional 
profits of the speculator in the second period correspond to the expected losses 
of the liquidity traders, which are, for a given of, increasing in A™̂ . Note that a 
more informative order flow does not mean in this case that the market is more 
efficient. In fact, given the larger initial uncertainty, the conditional variances 
of the fundamental value (EJ71̂  for t — 1 and 2) augment.
Finally, an increase in the quality of the external signal, measured by 
a.1 , has different effects according to its starting value. If oq is smaller than 
a threshold value, (o f /E f )1/2, we have the same effect of an increment of the 
uncertainty on the fundamental value, with the unique difference given by the 
efficiency of the market, which now rises. On the other hand, when aj is large, 
any increment of the signal quality forces the market maker to increase the 
liquidity of the market (A™̂  is smaller for t =  1 and 2) reducing the expected 
profits of the speculator in the second period. This means that the speculator 
will trade less aggressively in the first round of trading, injecting less noise in 
the order flow, and will expect smaller total profits.
3.3 Continuous Central Bank Intervention
Despite the presence of central banks in the foreign exchange market is sporadic, 
it might be interesting to establish if manipulation takes place when sterilised
5 The sign + / — in the Table indicates that the derivative of the coefficient changes sign from 
positive to negative when the parameter crosses a threshold value. The signs of the derivatives 
of the liquidity coefficients, and the trading intensities of the speculator ar e calculated deriving 
analytical expressions for the derivatives. The same applies to the first efficiency indicator, 





























































































intervention is continuous. As we said, when a2 is positive we are not able to 
provide a closed form solution for the optimisation problem of the speculator 
and a numerical procedure will be required. Nevertheless, general qualitative 
results may be obtained studying equation (12). In particular, the following 
Lemma provides a useful intuitive result.
Lemma 3 For any noise trading technology selected by the specidator in period 
1, her expected profits are decreasing in a2.
In fact, an increase in the intensity of trading of the central bank, a2. will force 
a reduction of the market order of the speculator in the second round of trading 
with a contraction of her expected profits. This Lemma immediately leads to 
the following important Proposition.
Proposition  6 For any choice of ai, there exists a minimum value a2 such 
that for a2 > a2, jL[7ts(61)|/s1] is negative for any noise trading technology t. As 
a consequence, the set of points (ai ,a2) such that no manipulation takes place 
is non-empty.
Indeed, as suggested by this Proposition, an aggressive trading rule of the 
central bank can always force the speculator out of the market. As an increase 
in a2 reduces the value of the “informational investment” , the speculator will 
not find it convenient to meet the initial cost for its acquisition and there will 
not be any manipulation.
As an explicative example consider Figure 1. Here, we present the graph 
of the expected profits of the speculator for two different trading rules of the 
central bank when cq =  Eq =  1, and <7/  =  0. In the left panel ax =  10a2, while 
in the right one «i - a2/2. As it is clear from the two panels, only when the 
central bank trades much less aggressively in the second period than in the first 
one, the speculator can expect profits when entering in the market. For «i < a2, 
instead, the profits she can gain in the second round of trading cannot cover the 
losses she incurs in the first one and the speculator docs not enter in the market 
at all. In synthesis, an active central bank can severely limit manipulation of 
the kind discussed here.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a possible reason which may induce uninformed 




























































































foreign exchange. We suggest that noise trading may be used to manipulate 
expectations and exchange rates in order to gain an informational advantage and 
hence a profit opportunity. To investigate this opportunity, we have developed 
a two auction model of the foreign exchange market, in which an uninformed 
speculator can exploit the impossibility of the market maker to distinguish 
between informed and uninformed clients to manipulate his expectations and 
the exchange rates and hence gain speculative profits. The main results of our 
analysis arc as follows.
1. Injecting noise in the order flow of the dealer, a rational uninformed spe­
culator interferes with the learning process of the market maker and de­
termines his degree of uncertainty on the fundamental value of a foreign 
currency. The possibility of reducing the resiliency of the market, that is 
the speed of convergence of the exchange to its fundamental value, per­
mits the speculator to gain and preserve an informational advantage with 
respect to the dealer.
2. The acquisition of this informational advantage corresponds to an “infor­
mational investment” , because the dealer provides liquidity to the market 
at a cost and hence placing random market orders is expensive. On the 
other hand, the informational advantage yields profits from future infor­
med trading. The solution of the trade-off between these costs and profits 
determines the optimal volume of speculative noise trading.
3. The equilibrium of the foreign exchange market with sporadic central bank 
intervention clearly indicates that speculative noise trading may be part 
of a profitable trading strategy in the foreign exchange market. In effect, 
the practice of giving spurious signals to other market participants to 
condition their expectations is common among professional traders. Inve­
stigating the market for foreign exchange, Lyons (1995) finds that a large 
component of the order flow of a dealer docs not contain information. 
Because most transactions in the foreign exchange market arc between 
professional traders, we can interpret this as evidence of attempts of ma­
nipulation.
4. When central bank intervention is continuous, the scope for manipulation 
can be severely limited, because the monetary authorities have the faculty 
of excluding uninformed speculator from the market. This also suggests 
that in other dealer markets, in which informed agents act strategically, 





























































































Proof o f Proposition 1.
We will prove that for a2 >  0 there exists a value E* for the conditional variance of 
the fundamental value at time t — 1, E [j^ , such that if this is smaller than or equal to 
E*, then the conditional variance of the fundamental value in the following round of 
trading, Ej71̂ , is greater than E™1̂ . We will also see that the value of E* is positive 
and increasing in the intensity of noise trading, bt.
Consider that by the application of the projection theorem we have:
£ mf _  altl£ ?J x + g/)
+ ° })  + °h
From this follows that E™  ̂ < E™  ̂ is equivalent to:
2tx̂ rnf \2 , 2 2rmf 2 2 v n“ «(E<-i) + a(<T/E (_1 -  > 0.
For £7̂  — 0 this inequality is always satisfied, so that the uncertainty on the funda­
mental value is decreasing over time. For a2 > 0, instead the inequality holds for 
E > E*, where this threshold value is given by:
E* =
a? I
Because E* is increasing in a 2t and hence in bt the proof is completed. □
Proof o f Proposition 2.
Consider the inequality E™  ̂ > E,^. From the definition of the conditional variances 
for the market maker and the speculator we have that:
v m/  —
v m/^t- 1+ cr2/
1 + > ( E mff-i
"t-1 + *#
1 + + a2)
So that the inequality among the variances is equivalent to:
E + ° } ) ( \  -  4 - )  > 0.VO/ vnt/
Eo; while for 6i > 0 cr^ > it2. Thus, E™  ̂ > E*For t =  1, note that E™  ̂ =  Ej^
Then, for t -- 2, •••,X the proof that Ej"^ > E'^ follows by induction. In fact, if 
EJj ĵ > E^J we have that Ej77̂  > E“  ̂ for any value of 6<. □
Proof o f Lemma 1.




























































































in the second period. Suppose the expected fundamental value of the speculator at 
the end of period 1 is s® and that the pricing rule of the market maker for the second 
period is:
s'? =  s ?  +  \™f A x2, (19)
where s’?  is the exchange rate in period t and A:r2 is the total order flow received by 









Then, it is simple to verify that in the second period the expected profits of the 
speculator are:
[(1 -  a2A ^)(sf -  sH ]2
E [n a2 \I2s] = 4a:m f
( 22)
Thus, the expected value of these profits, conditional on the speculator information 
set at the end of period 1, is given by:
( l - a 2A2m' ) 2
4Amf
E[(s\ -  s ? y \ i (23)
In order to evaluate this expectation, consider that in period 1 if the speculator 
places a random market order bitji, the dealer receives the following total market 
order, Aaq =  a i ( / i  — s q ) +  iqj/i +  He can use this observation of the order flow to
form an expectation of the fundamental value, f\\
s ?  =  so +  A ^ A x x , where A?1'  = aiS{
+ °l\
(24)
Observing the exchange rate at the end of the first round of trading the speculator 
can recover the value of the total market order, Aa?i, from equation (24). Thus, she 
is able to form a more efficient expectation of / i :
si = so + Ai'A j/i , where K ! = (25)
and Ay\ =  Aa:i — byr)\. In period 2 the market maker observes a new value of the 
order flow. Considering the expressions for A x2 and for s®, this observation of the 
order flow becomes:
A x2 = a2(f2 — s™ ) + o.ib2Xs/ fi — fc2sT* + b2\3/f\ + f2. (26)
Then, applying the projection theorem one obtains that the exchange rate in the 




























































































given the information set of the dealer at time 1 is null. In other words, the strategies 
of the two agents (in equations (19) and (20)) are mutually consistent.
Considering the expressions of s™, s i and those of and we can derive 
the following expectations:
Plugging these expectations in the right hand side of equation (23) one can obtain 
the following expression:
Proof o f Proposition 4.
To prove the Proposition we just need to show that the speculator finds it useful to 
employ a noise trading technology t in period 1 and then recoup the initial losses 
this generates in the second round of trading. Note that only unpredictable market 
orders in period 1 are useful, because otherwise the predictable part of A x ' would 
be filtered out from the total order flow, without affecting its informativeness, but 
increasing the expected losses of the speculator in period 1. Furthermore, considering 
that d2 =  0 the speculator maximizes with respect to b\ the following expression:




In order to find A™̂  we need to investigate the determination of the liquidity coeffi-
\m f _
2 "  Fb\ + a r
where H =  [a i£ { -  (o f +  a2E{)A™^]A'^,
Hb2
(29)
F  =  [afE {  +  o f  -  a i(2o,2 +  a2s f ) A ^ ] ( A ^ )2.
Since 62 — 1/(2A™^), it easy to prove that equation (29) becomes:
=  - î -x /2  H -  F.
Then, it is just a question of algebra to verify that 2 H — F  is equal to a iE{(A™^ — A*^), 





























































































It is then immediate to insert A™̂  in the expected second period profits and verify 
that the speculator maximises the following expression:
V(6r) =  { -b lX T 'v f  +  ^ y a i£ / (  A j ' - A ? ' ) } .
Let us take the first derivative of V with respect to u,. Then, considering that
dbf\™f c
<90,
= 2blXTf af (  al % ± ±
doiy/aiL^\{f - \ ? f ) _  bi\?f af a,<x,Si{_____
5il a lS i +  °l\ yJaxY.{(\\f  -  \™f )
we obtain that:
dV_ _  2fc,A7l /af 
dh  a2E f  +  a2,
a,(r,S{
_4v/a,s{(At/ -  A ^ )
-  (a2E { + a f)
A root of the first derivative of V corresponds to a root of the following equation:
2 v  /“1 aI ^1 _  ic< J v / , _2\2
Tf----~  16(ais i + a i ) •
V  -  A,
Now, considering that
\s f  *1
a\b\o ,2S (
(a\Y,{ +  <r,2)(a?E{ +  <r2x)
a root of equation (31) corresponds to a root of the following one: 
(a2E ( +  or21) =  166?(a2E{+<7?).
(31)
This quadratic equation possesses two distinct roots, symmetric around zero. We can 
take the positive one. We do not need to check for the second derivative, because for 
b\ | 0 the negative part of the derivative goes to zero faster than the positive one, so 
that we have a positive maximum. Thus, in the first round of trading the speculator 
employs a noise trading technology t, where:
<i?E { + a f
+ 15a216a2 v /l- î
1/2
Finally, following forward the solution of the model already sketched completes the 
proof and gives a full characterization of the equilibrium of the market. In fact, the 
exchange rate set in the first round of trading is given by equation (24),




























































































where, plugging the expression of b\ in Af‘^, the liquidity coefficient is:
y n f _  a iS ((1 6 a f£ { +  15of )
1 16(afE{ +  o f )2
Then, plugging equation (31) in equation (30) we find that the liquidity coefficient in 
period 2 is given by the following expression:
yrnf _
8(a2s {  +  o f)
Thus, in the second period, considering A™ ,̂ the speculator places the following 
market order:
where
-  b2(s{ -  * n , 
h  —
4(afE{ + of)
and s| is given by equation (25). Finally, the dealer sets the exchange rate according 
to equation (19):
s? = s?  + □
P r o o f  o f  L em m a 2.
From the expression for A[  ̂ — A™̂  we find that:
aL
2 \] a\Y.{(\3\
a io fs f
8(ajE{ + of)




Form which the expression for the total expected profits in equilibrium, £ [^ s|/si], is 
immediate. □
P r o o f  o f  P rop osition  5.
Considering the envelope theorem this result is immediate. It is in fact simple to 
calculate the following derivatives:
dE[TT'\Isl] a ? ( S { ) 2
Oaf 1 6(a2 E {  +  o f ) 2
0E[n°\Isl] ai of
Oaf 1 6 ( a f E {  +  o f ) 2
c>E[irs\Ist] o f  [of -  a f ( S {  )'




























































































P r o o f  o f  L em m a 3.
To prove this Lemma we need to show that (1 — a2X '^ )2/ 4A™  ̂ is decreasing in a2. 
Therefore, we need to calculate the liquidity coefficient A2"^. In accordance with the 
projection theorem:
s™ — s™ +  A™^Ax2, where 
y jn f _  COv(/2, Az2|̂ ml) 
var(Ax2|/mi)
in that E [A x2\Imi] =  0. Calculating these variance and covariance we find that:
\mf — a2 
(1 -  a iA ^ )P S {  -  X fX \ f crJb2 +  a2a}
(1 -  a iA ^ )P 2E { +  (A ^ )2(l  -  Ai>l)crfb‘2 -  X™f X3/PerJ +  o f  +  a2a|
(32)
where A™* =  <r2A ^ /a iS {  and P  =  aiXs/ b2 +  a2. Considering that i 2 =  (1 — 
n2A™^)/2A™^ we have that:
\mf  _  *
2 o2 +  262
Substituting this expression in equation (32) and rearranging gives the following equa­
tion in b2:
Ab\ +  Bb2 +  C  =  0, where
A =  a1E {(A j/  -  X™f ) >  0,
B =  a2 {2<r| +  s f[A s1' +  ( l - a 1A™/ )]}  >  0,
C  =  —er2,
and Aj( =  <r2A j^/aiE {. Then, taking the positive root of this equation we obtain:
h
\™fa2
A -  B
2 A '
A
a2A — B  -f- A
(33)
(34)
where A =  \/ B 2 — 4AC. From these two equations it is immediate to check that: 
(1 — a2X™ )̂ > 0, and that:




A (B 2 -  A 2) 
A (« 2- 4 -  B +  A )2 
B (P  -  A)
2a2A A
< 0,
Since (1 — a2X '^ )2/ 4A™  ̂ =  62(1 -  a2A2"^)/2 , an increase in a2 reduces the expected 
second period profits of the speculator, given the noise trading technology t. □
P r o o f  o f  P rop osition  6.
This proof is straightforward. Consider the expression for b2 in equation (33): for 
a2 ( + oc A l B. Therefore, b2 j  0 and so do the expected second period profits of 
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Table 1: Comparative Static
S ig n s  o f  D e r iv a t iv e s  o f  th e  
C h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  t h e  M a r k e t
bi A™' ^2 A™' £ i E ? '
v f + - + - + +
- + - + + +
at - + / - - / + + / - - -
Figure 1: Expected Profits of the Speculator as Functions of b\
LOW TRADING IN TE N SITY  O F TH E  CE N TR AL BANK HIGH TRADING IN TEN SITY O F T H E  C E N TR A L 8ANK
The continuous line refers to the total expected profits, while the dotted ones refer 
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